Tying Reality To Reason | A Correspondence Theory of Knowledge

Objectivism is a philosophical system created by Ayn Rand and developed/articulated by Leonard Peikoff. It holds existence to be the fundamental and self-evident truth from which all knowledge and philosophical thought is based. A corollary of this ‘primacy of existence’ starting point is the Correspondence Theory of Truth in Objectivist epistemology. The Correspondence Theory of Truth holds that truth is that which corresponds to the facts of reality. A belief is true if and only if it consistently refers to some part(s) or aspect(s) of existence.

This essay will apply the Correspondence Theory of Truth to the question of human knowledge, in order to formulate a unique reality-based theory of knowledge. This essay will also show why the Justified True Belief (JTB) account of knowledge is insufficient. Finally, this essay will show that this correspondence theory of knowledge is superior to all others by illustrating that it succeeds in cases where other epistemological theories fail. With both theory and practice in mind, this essay will advocate for a correspondence theory of knowledge.

The variant of the Correspondence Theory of knowledge as advocated in this essay is exclusionary, rather than pluralistic, in that it does not welcome the stipulations from other epistemological theories as its own (The Correspondence Theory of Truth). Since other theories of knowledge needlessly and unhelpfully exclude real types of human knowledge, alternative theories can only serve to undermine the Correspondence Theory of knowledge and strip it of intellectual merit.

The terminology used in this essay is relatively standard for philosophical essays of its type. Epistemology refers to the study of human knowledge, and to be epistemological means to be related to this field. The correspondence theory of knowledge as advocated in this essay is defined later on.

Why is a Stipulation to JTB Necessary?

The JTB account of knowledge is insufficient for accurately explaining human knowledge because it does not integrate justifications and inferences with reality. This shortcoming of the JTB account causes it to fall into absurdities in which it holds agents to possess knowledge, even though they fail to grasp sufficient understanding of relevant facts. This shortcoming of the JTB account is exposed brilliantly by Gettier, who presents a counterexample in his 1963 Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Gettier asks us to imagine a workplace in which only one of two men: Smith or Jones will be hired. The employer tells Smith that Jones will be hired, from which Smith infers that he will not be hired. Smith notices that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, and then concludes, given the information available to him, that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Later that day, Smith becomes informed that he will get the job instead of Jones. He also discovers, by coincidence, that he also has ten coins in his pocket (Gettier 122).

Smith’s hypothesis in this context qualifies as a justified true belief, since a) it is true that Smith believed that the man to be hired has ten coins in his pocket, b) Smith was justified in believing this from what he was told, and c) it corresponds to reality that the man who would be hired has ten coins in his pocket. Yet this state of affairs fails to describe what many people mean when they say “knowledge”. The essence of this phenomenon is more than that; and therefore any theory of knowledge must account for the relevant facts outside of Smith’s (or whoever’s) awareness. An efficacious epistemological theory must tie knowledge more closely and fundamentally with reality, which is the source of all truth and knowledge.

The Correspondence Theory of Knowledge

An efficacious epistemological theory must tie knowledge to reality, and it must do so not only in the concrete sense as JTB does, but also in the abstract sense. The knower of knowledge must have gotten to it through a reality-based means. To have knowledge of something in a given respect is to hold only premises that correspond to reality, and which logically follow from one another. Therefore, the fourth condition of human knowledge in addition to JTB is that the beliefs and inferences leading to the conclusion, as well as their relationship, must correspond to the facts of reality. In layman’s terms, this account entails that for a belief to qualify as knowledge, one must hold a JTB for the right reasons. Note that since all truth is connected, and reality possesses no contradictions, there is no need to differentiate between “the facts of reality” and “the relevant facts of reality”. If you have knowledge of some facts of reality, that knowledge will not contradict other facts of reality.

This theory is fundamentally different from the presence of falsehood (POF), which states that knowledge cannot be derived from a false belief, because the Correspondence Theory is a bottom-up process, rather than a top-down one (Dancy 27-29). It thus succeeds in the inference from many cases (IMC) problem whereas the POF theory fails.

An example of the IMC problem would be knowledge that, for example, large apes exist. You take a vacation to an African savannah, in which you see real-life gorillas, thus giving you knowledge that large apes exist. When you get home, you watch the movie King Kong, in which you believe that the large ape depicted in it really exists, without knowing that, in reality, it is merely computer generated imagery (CGI). Do you have knowledge that large apes exist?

According to the presence of falsehood theory, you do not have knowledge that large apes exist because your conclusion was based on a false premise (that King Kong exists). This theory rules out the possibility of having this knowledge, even though you have full and legitimate awareness of the fact that large apes exist.

According to the correspondence theory of knowledge, you still have knowledge that large apes exist, because your conclusion was based upon true and logically connected beliefs and inferences. You only lack this knowledge in respect of the King Kong movie. But this is only a lack of awareness, which does not negate the legitimate knowledge you derived from seeing gorillas (large apes) in real life.

This theory is also fundamentally different from Goldman’s Causal Theory of Knowledge which stipulates that, in addition to JTB, knowledge also depends on a further condition: the cause of one’s belief in X must be the same as that which caused X (Goldman).

One criticism of Goldman’s theory is that it fails to account for mathematical truths, such as the fact that 2 + 2 = 4, as there is no clear cause for the fact that 2 + 2 = 4. Mathematical truths are certainly corollaries of more fundamental metaphysical truths, that is, identity and thereby noncontradiction. However, these metaphysical truths do not cause 2 + 2 to equal 4 per se. Causation only occurs if and only if identity and noncontradiction are true. Since the truth of the equation that 2 + 2 = 4 is irreducibly true by the standard of existence, Goldman’s account of knowledge would rule out the possibility of mathematical knowledge being acquirable.

Goldman’s defense to this criticism is that JTB is sufficient for mathematical truths, and that his additional, causal condition is only necessary for empirical truths. If we take this defense at face value, this makes Goldman’s account of knowledge non-universalizable, thus rendering his account unable to fully achieve its goal: explaining all of human knowledge. Additionally, Goldman’s theory has an additional flaw, of which no such defense can be applied.

Goldman’s account of knowledge falls apart when faced with even the most rudimentary situations involving investigation or backtracking. My own personal example involves a team of CSI agents who are investigating the murder of John by an unknown killer. During their research, they find that the murder weapon contains fingerprints matching those of Harry. The police arrest Harry, who is then put on trial for intentional murder and is sentenced to life in prison. Assume that Harry did in fact intentionally kill John. According to Goldman, the CSI agents would have no way of knowing that Harry killed John, unless they were to possess records of the brain processes of Harry before his choice to commit murder. The CSI agents merely possessed evidence of Harry’s guilt, which is post-causal, rather than pre-causal information. The fingerprints on the murder weapon do not cause Harry’s guilt to be true. Rather, Harry’s guilt, in this case, caused the fingerprints to exist on the murder weapon. If the belief maker and truthmaker of Harry’s guilt must be the same thing, the CSI still lack sufficient evidence to know the truth of Harry’s guilt.

This new correspondence theory of knowledge succeeds the Smith & Jones case, the mathematical knowledge case, and the aforementioned John & Harry case. In the Smith & Jones case, Smith did not know that the man who would be hired has ten coins in his pocket because his beliefs and inferences, as well as their relationship was not consistent with the facts of reality. Specifically, his belief that Jones would be hired and his inference thereof did not correspond to the facts of reality. Mathematical knowledge is clearly possible according to this account, so long as you use the appropriate means of acquiring it. You simply observe from the facts of reality that 2 and 2 of something is equal to 2 and 2 of that same thing. This account also allows for arriving at a single mathematical truth through multiple valid avenues. In the John & Harry case, knowledge of Harry’s guilt is possible, as the beliefs and inferences, and their relationship held by the CSI agents were consistent with reality, even if in reverse order.

Criticisms of The Correspondence Theory of Knowledge

One criticism of the correspondence theory of knowledge is that it is too narrow, in that it does not account for moral truths, which according to some critics do not correspond to any fact of reality. Therefore, according to these critics, knowledge of morality is impossible under the correspondence theory of truth.

The error of such a criticism is its false premise that morality cannot be derived from facts of existence, in other words, that ethics has no relationship to reason (The Correspondence Theory of Truth). Living organisms are bound by certain facts of reality, and have certain requirements for their survival. Beings whose means of survival depends upon reason and choice require a code of values, because for these types of organism, survival itself presupposes the valuing of one’s own life. Therefore, the proper code of moral values for a rational being to adopt is one of selfishness.

“An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means - and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil (Rand, Ayn).”

Another criticism of this theory is that a correspondence theory of knowledge is too obvious, and that its vacuous nature makes it unhelpful as a theory of knowledge. Correspondence to reality is already implicit within common discussion about knowledge, so this theory explains nothing about the nature of it (The Correspondence Theory of Truth).

Sometimes the most obvious things are the hardest for people to grasp, and are the most consequential in man’s existence. The seemingly obvious nature of the correspondence theory is evidence of its clarity, and its ability to effectively explain the nature of knowledge.

There are also many theories of knowledge which do not share the correspondence theory’s fundamental ideas, such as coherence or pragmatist theories (Truth). Since these theories have fundamentally different ideas of what truth and knowledge mean, as opposed to the correspondence theory, it is apparent that the latter’s fundamental ideas are not universally accepted.

External world skeptics believe that the Correspondence Theory of Knowledge is begging the question in its standard of truth, never stopping to justify the existence of an external reality from which knowledge is based. Therefore, according to external world skepticism, this theory of knowledge is based on circular reasoning.

Existence is the self-evident and self-justifying truth from which all knowledge is based. It does not require argumentative justification because all argumentation presupposes that reality exists. In actuality, it is the external world skeptics who are being fallacious, in that they are stealing the concept of “evidence” without any standard of truth from which it is justified. Therefore, the doubt of external world skeptics is fundamentally baseless and self-defeating.

Due to the fact that this correspondence theory of knowledge succeeds in cases where other fail, the correspondence theory should be extolled as the superior account. The correspondence theory succeeds to this greater degree because it more fundamentally ties knowledge and reality together, in both the concrete and abstract sense.

Works Cited:

“Truth”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#CorThe

“The Correspondence Theory of Truth”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/

Rand, Ayn. “The Objectivist Ethics”. Ayn Rand Institute. Online.

https://courses.aynrand.org/works/the-objectivist-ethics/

Gettier, E.L. (1963) “Is justified true belief knowledge?”, Analysis 23(6): 121-123

Goldman. (1967) “A Causal Theory of Knowing”. The Journal of Philosophy.

Dancy. “Knowledge”. 2.3: Responses to Gettier: 27-29.